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Horizontal Mergers: Law, Policy, and Economics 
By GEORGE A. HAY AND GREGORY J. WERDEN* 
The legality of a horizontal merger under 
section 7 of the Clayton Act turns on a 
reckoning of its social costs and benefits. 
This paper reviews what economics has to 
say about that reckoning and explores the 
relationship between economic learning and 
merger law and policy.' 
I. The Costs and Benefits of Mergers 
The main social cost associated with hori- 
zontal mergers arises from their potential to 
raise price and restrict output. Oligopoly 
models offer insights into such effects, and 
we consider them in two groups: models 
that involve something termed "collusion" 
and models that do not. 
Collusion models began with Edward 
Chamberlin. He argued that, if competitors 
were sufficiently few, they would recognize 
the benefit from acting cooperatively and do 
so, achieving joint profit maximization with- 
out communication. This notion of tacit col- 
lusion captured the imagination of econo- 
mists. Difficulties in reaching an agreement 
on price were recognized, but the incentive 
to do so was argued to be very powerful. 
George Stigler's (1964) highly influential 
model focused on the problem of enforcing 
an agreement. Enforcement depends cru- 
cially on being able to detect cheating, and 
Stigler showed that detection is easier with 
fewer firms. 
More recently, game theory has under- 
scored the importance of Stigler's insight 
and has shown that Chamberlin's notion 
cannot be captured in a one-shot game be- 
cause the incentive to cheat is more power- 
ful than the incentive to agree. Models of 
repeated games, however, have breathed 
new life into the notion of tacit collusion by 
demonstrating that joint maximization is an 
equilibrium of a repeated game with threats 
of punishment, provided that the discount 
factor is sufficiently high (see Carl Shapiro, 
1989). 
Collusion models generally support a 
structural merger policy but do not make 
predictions sufficiently clear to be useful in 
identifying which mergers should be pre- 
vented. The models of Chamberlin and 
Stigler predict that increased concentration 
from mergers can lead to collusion and 
identify factors facilitating collusion; how- 
ever, neither makes more specific predic- 
tions. Models of repeated games indicate 
that tacit collusion is possible even with very 
large numbers of firms and predict only that 
collusion is one of many possible equilibria 
(see e.g., Carl Shapiro, 1989, pp. 364-6, 371, 
379). 
Noncollusion models provide clearer pre- 
dictions. The Bertrand model yields a one- 
shot Nash equilibrium in prices. With dif- 
ferentiated products, Raymond Deneckere 
and Carl Davidson (1985) have demon- 
strated fairly generally that mergers in 
Bertrand models raise price. Auction mod- 
els are a variation on the Bertrand theme, 
incorporating uncertainty about costs or val- 
ues, and they make similar predictions. 
The Cournot model yields a one-shot 
Nash equilibrium in quantities. Joseph 
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) have demon- 
strated that mergers in Cournot models al- 
ways raise price. A limiting case of the 
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1We also note that the most important contributions 
made by economics to merger law and policy were the 
most basic. Economics provided a rationale for merger 
policy by explaining the welfare effects of monopoly. 
Economics set the task for merger enforcement by 
explaining that mergers have both costs and benefits. 
Economics provided basic constructs critical to under- 
standing markets: supply and demand, equilibrium, 
opportunity cost, and especially, economic rationality. 
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Cournot model is the dominant-firm model, 
and in this model acquisitions of fringe firms 
by the dominant firm necessarily raise price. 
The Cournot model has endured a cen- 
tury of criticism. The oldest criticism is that 
setting prices rather than quantities is more 
realistic and that predictions are drastically 
different with price-setting. This objection 
has not been disposed of completely, but 
David Kreps and Jose Scheinkman (1983) 
have shown that capacity-setting followed 
by price-setting yields a Cournot equilib- 
rium, provided that rationing is efficient. 
Other objections are that firms can do bet- 
ter and that Cournot behavior is inconsis- 
tent with rational expectations, but game 
theory has exploded both objections within 
the context of one-shot games (see Andrew 
Daughety, 1985). The Cournot model also is 
the only one for which it has been shown 
that price and output effects of mergers are 
well predicted by conventional measures 
of market shares and concentration (see 
Werden, 1991a). 
The most telling objection to all oligopoly 
models is that they are too simplistic, ignor- 
ing essential dynamic and strategic aspects 
of competition. There is no satisfactory an- 
swer to this objection, but the detailed anal- 
ysis done in actual merger investigations fills 
some of the gaps left by oligopoly models. 
It is desirable to have an empirical basis 
for merger policy, and until the mid-1970's 
most economists probably believed that in- 
terindustry concentration-profits studies 
provided that basis. These studies have since 
been attacked on many fronts, and few 
economists continue to believe that such 
studies provide a substantial basis for merger 
policy (see Werden, 1991b pp. 16-17). 
Richard Schmalensee (1989 p. 988) has 
deemed intraindustry studies of the rela- 
tionship between concentration and price to 
be the best empirical foundation for merger 
policy (for surveys, see Leonard Weiss [1989] 
and Werden [1991b]). These studies have 
significant problems as well, but most sug- 
gest that the Cournot prediction is roughly 
right (see Luke Froeb and Werden, 1991 
pp. 12-13). 
Ideally, we wopild want to base policy on 
experience with actual consummated merg- 
ers, but only a handful of such mergers have 
been studied. David Barton and Roger 
Sherman (1984), Severin Borenstein (1990), 
and Werden et al. (1991) examined four 
mergers that were opposed by federal an- 
titrust enforcement agencies and that in- 
volved large shares in the relevant markets. 
They found that at least three raised price 
significantly. Lawrence Schumann et al. 
(1992) examined three mergers not opposed 
by federal antitrust enforcement agencies. 
They found that at most one raised price 
significantly. 
There is less economic learning on the 
social benefits of mergers than on their so- 
cial costs. Oligopoly theory makes no im- 
portant predictions about mergers effi- 
ciencies. The empirical literature indicates 
that shareholders benefit from takeovers 
(see e.g., Michael Jensen and Richard 
Ruback, 1983), but shareholders would ben- 
efit from anticompetitive mergers as well as 
efficient ones. It also indicates that mergers 
generally have not increased the profitabil- 
ity of the acquired firms, but few significant 
horizontal mergers have been examined (see 
e.g., David Ravenscraft and F. M. Scherer, 
1987 [especially pp. 211-12]). We know of 
no published case studies evaluating in de- 
tail the effects of particular mergers on costs. 
Economics also offers little in the way of 
tools for assessing the magnitude of likely 
efficiencies from proposed mergers. More- 
over, efficiencies may not be unique to 
merger (i.e., they may be achievable, at least 
to some extent, without horizontal mergers), 
and it is difficult to assess the feasibility of 
various sorts of contracts and joint ventures 
that can be used to achieve the same effi- 
ciencies. 
Also critical to the social costs and bene- 
fits of mergers are prospects for entry. Eco- 
nomics offers many useful insights about 
entry, but reliable predictions normally are 
not possible. Theory has demonstrated 
the crucial role of sunk costs (see William 
Baumol et al., 1982), but it has not indi- 
cated how large sunk costs must be or how 
long investments must be committed in or- 
der to deter entry (see e.g., Marius Schwartz, 
1986). Experience teaches that entry can be 
a powerful engine for competition-so pow- 
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erful that mergers may not matter. Experi- 
ence also teaches that market power may be 
exercised for a long time despite the possi- 
bility of entry. 
II. Merger Law and Policy 
Two Supreme Court cases in the early 
1960's established the case law's basic ap- 
proach to mergers under section 7 of the 
Clayton Act. Economic learning shaped this 
case law, but the courts generally did not 
cite it. In Brown Shoe, the Court set out 
criteria for market delineation, including 
cross elasticity of demand, borrowed from 
economics, and seven infamous "practical 
indicia" for delineating "submarkets." In 
Philadelphia National Bank, the Court es- 
tablished a presumption of illegality for hor- 
izontal mergers based on market shares, 
and this presumption was justified in part 
on the grounds that it was "fully consonant 
with economic theory." 
These two decisions led to hundreds of 
others in which markets typically were de- 
lineated arbitrarily and mergers were held 
unlawful even when the alleged, markets 
were relatively unconcentrated and the 
combined market shares of the merging 
firms were less than 10 percent. Apart from 
the oblique reference in Philadelphia Na- 
tional Bank, the only other reference to 
economic theory was one in Rome Cable, 
apparently to Chamberlin's notion. Effi- 
ciencies were held to be grounds for con- 
demning a merger, and entry was barely 
mentioned. In dissent, Justice Potter Stew- 
art wrote: "The sole consistency that I can 
find is that in litigation under ?7, the Gov- 
ernment always wins." 
In this era, economic learning had greater 
influence on merger policy. Donald Turner, 
a Harvard Ph.D. in economics and an ad- 
herent of Chamberlin's view of oligopoly, 
was responsible for the 1968 Merger Guide- 
lines. Their restrictive market share and 
concentration thresholds no doubt reflected 
the conventional economic wisdom of the 
day. The 1968 Guidelines did not adopt the 
"practical indicia" or "submarket" con- 
cepts, but stili entertained rather arbitrary 
market delineation. The 1968 Guidelines 
made no mention of entry and considered 
efficiencies to be a possible defense only in 
"exceptional circumstances." 
Merger policy over the past decade has 
differed markedly from that in the 1960's. 
The changes are largely attributable to new 
economic learning, and the 1982 Merger 
Guidelines were a major milestone. Those 
Guidelines were the first important policy 
statement to rely explicitly on oligopoly mod- 
els. They devoted a great deal of attention 
to collusion models and a little to the domi- 
nant-firm model. Their creator, William 
Baxter, rejected Chamberlin's view of oligo- 
poly, and their market-share and concentra- 
tion presumptions were much less restric- 
tive than those in the 1968 Guidelines. The 
1982 Guidelines created safe harbors for 
mergers in markets with (postmerger) HHI's 
below 1,000 and for mergers that increased 
the HHI less than 50. The 1982 Guidelines 
placed substantial weight on entry consider- 
ations and considered efficiencies to be a 
possible defense in "extraordinary circum- 
stances." The 1982 Guidelines also articu- 
lated market-delineation principles based on 
the fundamental concern in merger cases: 
market power. 
The 1984 Merger Guidelines were a mi- 
nor revision aimed primarily at taking some 
of the weight off the numbers and perhaps 
relaxing the standards. The 1984 Guidelines 
considered efficiencies in all cases but re- 
quired "clear and convincing evidence." 
The case law over the past decade also 
differs greatly from that discussed above, 
and the 1982 Merger Guidelines and new 
economic learning probably have been 
largely responsible for the changes. We sus- 
pect that objections to the concentration- 
profits studies have played a significant role 
in the relaxation of merger standards. The 
case law still relies little on oligopoly mod- 
els, but references to them have become 
more prominent, and all have been to collu- 
sion models. Earlier cases holding that ef- 
ficiencies were grounds for condemning, 
rather than permitting, mergers have not 
been explicitly overruled, but only a radical 
fringe consider them to be good law today. 
Many relatively recent cases have adopted 
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and applied the important insights on mar- 
ket delineation in the 1982 Merger Guide- 
lines. The two most notable features of 
merger law over the past decade have been 
that the government generally has lost and 
that the stated rationale most often was that 
entry or the threat of entry would prevent 
or cure any anticompetitive effects. 
The 1992 Guidelines pay roughly equal 
attention to collusion models and the 
Bertrand model for differentiated products. 
While not invoked in an easily recognizable 
way, the Cournot and dominant-firm models 
also are mentioned. The 1992 Guidelines 
devote extraordinary attention to entry. 
Their extensive discussion is difficult to 
summarize, but the important point is that 
the 1992 Guidelines offer what is meant to 
be a means of predicting whether entry will 
prevent or cure any anticompetitive effects 
of a merger. 
III. Conclusions 
Merger law and policy have come a long 
way under the guidance of economic learn- 
ing, and we think that both are basically 
sound. While there is considerable room for 
disagreement about the implications of eco- 
nomic learning for merger policy, we believe 
that there is a sufficient theoretical and 
empirical basis for a structural merger pol- 
icy that accords proper weight to considera- 
tions of entry and efficiencies. The Cournot, 
the Bertrand, dominant-firm, and other 
models support the prevention of at least 
very substantial mergers in most cases, as 
does the limited empirical evidence. 
Collusion of various sorts does occur and 
is a real concern in merger cases; however, 
the available evidence indicates that collu- 
sion concerns do not justify a merger policy 
significantly more restrictive than that sug- 
gested by noncollusive models. While the 
presence or absence of factors facilitating 
collusion certainly is relevant in merger 
cases, the absence of such factors does not 
justify permitting a merger if noncollusive 
models and the facts of the particular case 
indicate that the merger's costs exceed its 
benefits. Noncollusion models should be re- 
lied on more than they have been. 
Following the advice of economists, there 
has been a pronounced movement in merger 
law and policy away from reliance on simple 
presumptions, and it may have gone too far. 
There certainly is an important role to be 
played by careful economic analysis of par- 
ticular mergers. The economist's basic tools 
applied to the detailed facts of an actual 
industry may yield valuable insights. How- 
ever, we should not kid ourselves about our 
ability to predict accurately the effects of 
particular mergers. Estimation of the price 
and output effects of mergers (assuming no 
efficiencies) is rather crude, and estimation 
of the magnitude of unique efficiencies and 
prediction about entry are even less reli- 
able. 
In light of these limitations, we think that 
there is considerable merit to a merger pol- 
icy that relies to some extent on simple 
rules and that makes no pretext of explicitly 
measuring the costs and benefits of particu- 
lar mergers. In addition to the fact that 
there may be no reasonable alternative, 
simple rules have significant advantages. 
They make enforcement far more pre- 
dictable, benefiting business planning, and 
they make enforcement less expensive. 
While the accuracy of court decisions may 
suffer, that is not so clear. It may come as a 
blow to economists' vanity, but the outcome 
of merger litigation probably is not greatly 
affected by careful economic analysis. 
Simple rules come in many flavors, some 
of which are more popular than others. The 
most popular is the delineation of safe har- 
bors based on concentration and market 
shares. Another fairly popular one is con- 
sidering efficiencies primarily implicitly, in 
formulating market share and concentration 
standards. Less popular are rules presuming 
mergers to be unlawful on the basis of mar- 
ket shares and concentration, but we favor 
such presumptions under certain circum- 
stances. Thresholds for making a challenge 
truly likely should be fairly high (e.g., an 
HHI of 2,500 and a change of 500), and 
even then, entry, efficiencies, and other fac- 
tors should be considered. We also would 
not invoke any such presumptions for dif- 
ferentiated products or products sold 
through auction mechanisms. For such 
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products, more direct estimation of the ef- 
fects of mergers, focusing on the degree of 
head-to-head competition, would be better. 
As we learn more, we can expect merger 
law and policy to adapt. We hope that nei- 
ther will be too receptive to the latest devel- 
opments in oligopoly theory or the latest 
empirical results. One clear message from 
history is that new ideas and results ulti- 
mately may have little policy relevance. Pa- 
pers with strong, and unjustifiable, policy 
conclusions appear regularly, even in The 
American Economic Review. 
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